Samson Mow, a Bitcoin developer and the CEO of JAN3, is advising the Bitcoin community to take a cautious approach to adopting new, quantum-resistant cryptography. He argues that moving too quickly to implement these changes could create vulnerabilities and risks for the network *right now*, potentially causing more problems than the future threat of quantum computers.
These statements follow Anthropic’s recent findings: their AI model, Mythos Preview, successfully identified previously unknown vulnerabilities in some older, less secure encryption methods.
No need to rush
As an analyst, I’ve been following the debate around Bitcoin and potential threats like quantum computing. Mow believes it’s crucial to stick with Bitcoin’s current, cautious approach to development, even while acknowledging those future risks. He argues against making significant changes now.
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Mow recently warned on X that rushing to update Bitcoin’s encryption could create weaknesses, not just to traditional hacking methods, but potentially to attacks powered by artificial intelligence. He initially expressed this concern a few months ago, and now believes AI poses an additional threat.
He cautioned that switching Bitcoin’s existing digital signature methods (ECDSA and Schnorr) to new, quantum-resistant options right now might unexpectedly make the network *more* vulnerable to attacks from regular computers.
As a researcher, I’ve been looking into the potential risks of quickly switching Bitcoin’s signature schemes from ECDSA/Schnorr to post-quantum (PQ) signatures. My concern is that doing so too soon could actually *increase* our vulnerability to attacks from standard computers today. Essentially, we need to avoid solving the quantum computing threat only to be defeated by conventional hacking methods.
Mow believes Bitcoin doesn’t need to change until quantum computers become a real and present danger.
We should switch to PQ signatures only after a real threat from quantum computers emerges – once they actually exist. For Bitcoin, it’s best to focus on gradual, careful improvements rather than rushing into changes.
Mow also highlighted promising research from Blockstream’s cryptography team. He noted that systems relying on hashing are generally considered more secure against attacks because they present a simpler mathematical structure compared to newer approaches, such as HAWK which is based on lattices.
A new cryptography debate
Mythos Preview has revealed a significantly quicker way to break a limited version of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). They also found ways to enhance an existing method for recovering the private key used in the HAWK encryption system.
Anthropic says these discoveries aren’t an immediate danger, but they’ve led to conversations within the Bitcoin community about whether AI could eventually challenge some of the advanced encryption methods used to secure the network.
Bitcoin’s long-term advantage?
As a researcher at Ledger, I’ve been following the rapid evolution of AI and its impact on cybersecurity. Our recent work clearly demonstrates just how quickly things are changing in this space, as highlighted by our CTO, Charles Guillemet.
According to Guillemet, artificial intelligence is quickly changing how we approach security, and it could also significantly impact the field of cryptography.
He pointed out that the research from Anthropic primarily impacts the latest security ideas behind HAWK, not general lattice cryptography.
This finding doesn’t mean lattice cryptography is generally broken. It specifically affects the recent security ideas used in Hawk, which haven’t been tested and reviewed as thoroughly as those behind older, well-established systems like Dilithium.
As a crypto investor, I found Guillemet’s point really resonated with me. He’s basically saying we *need* ‘crypto-agility’ – meaning the flexibility to swap out encryption methods easily without having to rebuild everything from scratch. It makes total sense; things change fast in this space, and being able to adapt quickly is crucial for long-term security.
It’s becoming more and more obvious that software needs to be ‘crypto-agile’ – meaning it can easily update its encryption methods without needing a complete overhaul. This will likely become essential for security, and I’m eager to see this implemented in Bitcoin, he explained.
2026-07-29 12:49