Trustless Teams: Scaling Collaboration with Blockchain Verification

Author: Denis Avetisyan


A new framework, DAO-Agent, leverages zero-knowledge proofs to fairly measure contributions in decentralized multi-agent systems without crippling on-chain costs.

The system introduces a hybrid DAO-Agent architecture designed to reconcile off-chain computation with on-chain security, employing a four-stage process-off-chain execution and commitment, coordinator-verified integrity leveraging the Shapley value <span class="katex-eq" data-katex-display="false">\phi\_{i}</span> and the Efficiency Axiom <span class="katex-eq" data-katex-display="false">\sum\mu\_{i}=v(\mathcal{N})</span>, recursive proof composition reducing an <span class="katex-eq" data-katex-display="false">O(2^{n})</span> computation to a constant-size proof, and on-chain settlement via a single pairing check-to enable trustless, automated reward distribution despite the inherent complexities of collaborative systems.
The system introduces a hybrid DAO-Agent architecture designed to reconcile off-chain computation with on-chain security, employing a four-stage process-off-chain execution and commitment, coordinator-verified integrity leveraging the Shapley value \phi\_{i} and the Efficiency Axiom \sum\mu\_{i}=v(\mathcal{N}), recursive proof composition reducing an O(2^{n}) computation to a constant-size proof, and on-chain settlement via a single pairing check-to enable trustless, automated reward distribution despite the inherent complexities of collaborative systems.

DAO-Agent uses a hybrid on/off-chain approach and Shapley values to enable constant-cost verification of agent contributions using cryptographic proofs.

Decentralized multi-agent systems offer the potential for collaborative problem-solving, yet ensuring fair contribution measurement and incentive distribution in trustless environments remains a significant challenge. This paper introduces ‘DAO-Agent: Zero Knowledge-Verified Incentives for Decentralized Multi-Agent Coordination’, a novel framework leveraging zero-knowledge proofs and Shapley values to enable constant-cost on-chain verification of agent contributions. By shifting computationally intensive tasks off-chain and employing a hybrid architecture, DAO-Agent dramatically reduces verification costs compared to traditional blockchain approaches. Will this framework unlock truly scalable and equitable coordination for increasingly complex decentralized autonomous organizations?


Centralized Systems: A Recipe for Disaster

Historically, systems governing complex operations – from financial institutions to supply chains – have relied on centralized architectures. These structures, while often efficient, inherently create vulnerabilities stemming from a lack of transparency and concentrated control. Trust becomes paramount, as participants must rely on the integrity of a single entity to accurately record transactions and enforce rules. Furthermore, the concentration of power introduces a single point of failure; a compromise of the central authority, whether through malicious attack or internal error, can disrupt the entire system. This reliance fosters potential for censorship, manipulation, and a lack of accountability, prompting a search for more resilient and equitable alternatives that distribute control and enhance verifiability across all participants.

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations represent a potential paradigm shift in organizational structure, envisioning entities governed by rules encoded in smart contracts and operating without central authority. However, realizing this potential hinges on developing sophisticated coordination mechanisms capable of managing complex interactions between numerous, potentially anonymous, participants. Unlike traditional hierarchies, DAOs necessitate protocols for proposal submission, voting, and automated execution that are both secure and efficient at scale. The difficulty lies not simply in enabling decentralized decision-making, but in ensuring that collective action aligns with the organization’s objectives, incentivizes positive contributions, and mitigates the risks associated with malicious actors or flawed code. Consequently, research focuses on novel consensus algorithms, reputation systems, and economic models designed to foster trust and facilitate effective governance within these emerging decentralized structures.

Current multi-agent systems, while demonstrating promise in controlled settings, frequently stumble when applied to the demands of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations. These systems often rely on centralized planning or broadcast communication, proving inefficient and unsustainable as the number of agents – representing DAO members or automated processes – increases. The computational cost of consensus mechanisms, combined with the bandwidth limitations of blockchain networks, creates significant scalability bottlenecks. Moreover, many existing algorithms struggle to adapt to the dynamic and often unpredictable nature of DAO participation, where agents may join or leave at any time. This necessitates the development of novel coordination strategies that prioritize asynchronous communication, localized decision-making, and robust fault tolerance to effectively manage the complexities of large-scale, decentralized operations.

Decentralized systems, while promising increased resilience and transparency, grapple with the fundamental issue of equitably recognizing and rewarding individual contributions. Establishing accountability proves particularly complex when traditional hierarchical structures are absent; determining the value of diverse skills and efforts within a DAO, and then appropriately distributing benefits or assigning responsibility, demands novel approaches. Current solutions often struggle to prevent ‘free-riding’ – where individuals benefit without contributing – or to accurately assess the impact of non-quantifiable contributions, such as community building or strategic foresight. Consequently, research focuses on developing mechanisms – including reputation systems, token-weighted voting, and algorithmic contribution tracking – designed to incentivize participation, discourage malicious behavior, and ensure that accountability is distributed, rather than concentrated, within the decentralized network.

Despite increasing task complexity, on-chain verification maintains stability with consistently low proof sizes and verification times.
Despite increasing task complexity, on-chain verification maintains stability with consistently low proof sizes and verification times.

DAO-Agent: A Framework for Decentralized Intelligence (and a Bit of Sanity)

The DAO-Agent framework utilizes a combination of blockchain technology, Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), and the Shapley Value concept to create a system for decentralized intelligence. Blockchain provides the foundational infrastructure for secure and transparent record-keeping and execution of agreements. ZKPs are integrated to allow agents to verify the validity of computations and contributions without revealing the underlying data, preserving privacy and enhancing security. The Shapley Value, a concept from cooperative game theory, is then applied to fairly distribute rewards and incentives based on each agent’s marginal contribution to the overall outcome, ensuring equitable compensation and encouraging collaborative participation within the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO).

The DAO-Agent framework achieves secure coordination by leveraging blockchain’s immutability to record agent interactions and contributions. Verifiability is ensured through the implementation of Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), which allow agents to prove the validity of their work without revealing the underlying data, thus preserving privacy and preventing manipulation. Fairness in coordination is established by objectively quantifying each agent’s contribution to the DAO’s outcomes, enabling the distribution of rewards and responsibilities based on demonstrable impact rather than subjective assessment.

DAO-Agent utilizes Shapley Value, a concept from cooperative game theory, to equitably distribute rewards among contributing agents. This method calculates each agent’s average marginal contribution to all possible coalitions, providing a quantifiable measure of individual impact. By weighting contributions based on this value, the framework ensures that compensation is proportional to actual impact on DAO outcomes, rather than simply based on task completion or time spent. This incentivizes agents to prioritize high-value contributions and fosters collaborative behavior, as agents are rewarded for positively influencing the overall success of the DAO, even when working in concert with others. The resulting distribution is guaranteed to be individually rational and coalition rational, preventing strategic misrepresentation of contributions and promoting stable, efficient collaboration.

The DAO-Agent framework utilizes a Hybrid On-chain/Off-chain architecture to optimize performance and reduce transaction costs. Computationally intensive tasks, such as contribution verification and Shapley Value calculation, are performed off-chain to minimize on-chain operations. Only essential data, like aggregated contributions and final reward allocations, are recorded on-chain. This approach achieves a reported gas cost reduction of up to 99.9% when compared to a fully on-chain implementation involving ten agents, significantly improving scalability and economic feasibility for decentralized autonomous organizations.

Our hybrid approach achieves a <span class="katex-eq" data-katex-display="false">99.9%</span> reduction in verification gas cost for larger agent coalitions (<span class="katex-eq" data-katex-display="false">n=10</span>), exhibiting constant cost scaling compared to the exponential growth of the baseline.
Our hybrid approach achieves a 99.9% reduction in verification gas cost for larger agent coalitions (n=10), exhibiting constant cost scaling compared to the exponential growth of the baseline.

Optimizing Verification with Advanced Cryptography (Because Efficiency Matters)

Recursive Proof Composition within the framework utilizes a layered approach to minimize on-chain verification costs. Specifically, STARK proofs are employed for initial computation, and the resulting proof is then recursively aggregated within a Groth16 proof system. This nesting allows for the compression of multiple STARK proofs into a single, smaller Groth16 proof. The Groth16 proof, requiring significantly less data for on-chain verification than the constituent STARK proofs, dramatically reduces gas consumption and processing time. This recursive structure optimizes verification by shifting computationally intensive tasks off-chain and presenting a concise verification artifact to the blockchain.

Complex computational tasks are performed off-chain to minimize on-chain gas costs and execution time. This approach delegates intensive processing to external environments, and then utilizes Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) to verify the correctness of the off-chain results on the blockchain. Specifically, the system generates a concise cryptographic proof demonstrating that the computation was performed correctly without revealing the underlying data or the computation itself. This allows the blockchain to efficiently validate the integrity of complex operations with minimal overhead, enhancing scalability and reducing transaction fees.

Cryptographic commitment within the framework utilizes a hashing function to create a fixed-size representation of data, ensuring data integrity and enabling verifiable storage and retrieval. This commitment is secured through integration with the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), a decentralized storage network. By storing the commitment hash on-chain and the underlying data on IPFS, the system guarantees that any modification to the data will result in a different commitment hash, immediately detectable during verification. This approach provides a tamper-proof record of data, allowing agents to confidently retrieve and utilize information with cryptographic assurance of its authenticity and unaltered state.

Proof batching is implemented to optimize on-chain verification by aggregating multiple individual proofs into a single, consolidated proof for verification. This technique achieves a constant gas cost of 27,000 gas units for verification, irrespective of the number of agents involved. Consequently, verification time remains consistent at 0.36 seconds, providing predictable performance and scalability benefits regardless of system load or the number of participating entities. This constant cost is a direct result of amortizing the verification expense across multiple proofs within the single batch.

Despite exponential scaling in off-chain proof generation time <span class="katex-eq" data-katex-display="false">(STARK)</span>, on-chain verification remains consistently negligible at under 0.4 seconds, demonstrating a favorable computational trade-off.
Despite exponential scaling in off-chain proof generation time (STARK), on-chain verification remains consistently negligible at under 0.4 seconds, demonstrating a favorable computational trade-off.

Scaling Decentralized Systems: Layer-2 and Beyond (A Realistic Outlook)

The practical implementation of DAO-Agent hinges on overcoming the inherent limitations of blockchain scalability and cost, and Layer-2 deployment offers a compelling solution. By processing transactions off-chain and leveraging technologies like optimistic rollups or zero-knowledge proofs, Layer-2 networks drastically reduce the computational burden on the main blockchain. This translates directly into significantly lower transaction fees and increased throughput, making it economically feasible to support a large number of agents and complex interactions within a DAO. Consequently, DAO-Agent becomes viable for large-scale applications, such as decentralized supply chain management, sophisticated financial modeling, or large-scale data analysis, where the costs associated with on-chain execution would otherwise be prohibitive. The reduction in cost and increase in speed unlock the potential for truly decentralized, autonomous organizations capable of handling real-world complexity.

Calculating Shapley values – a cornerstone of cooperative game theory used to fairly distribute rewards based on each agent’s contribution – often becomes computationally prohibitive in systems with many participants. Monte Carlo Shapley Estimation provides a pragmatic solution by leveraging random sampling to approximate these values. Instead of exhaustively evaluating every possible coalition, this method efficiently estimates the marginal contribution of each agent through numerous randomly generated coalitions. This approach dramatically reduces the computational burden, making it feasible to apply reward mechanisms based on Shapley values to large-scale multi-agent systems, even those involving hundreds or thousands of interacting entities. The technique allows for a scalable and practical implementation of fair reward distribution in complex decentralized environments where precise calculation of Shapley values is otherwise impossible, enabling effective coordination and incentivization.

This innovative framework transcends the limitations of conventional multi-agent systems by integrating Large Language Models (LLMs) to construct fully autonomous agents operating within Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). Unlike traditional systems relying on pre-programmed responses, these LLM-based agents demonstrate emergent behavior, adapting and collaborating through natural language processing and reasoning. This allows for the creation of highly flexible and intelligent DAOs capable of tackling complex tasks without constant human intervention. The system facilitates nuanced negotiation, dynamic task allocation, and proactive problem-solving, effectively enabling DAOs to evolve beyond simple automation and towards genuine decentralized intelligence.

DAO-Agent fundamentally alters the landscape of decentralized autonomous organizations by resolving longstanding issues in coordinating numerous independent agents. This framework doesn’t merely facilitate interaction; it establishes a robust system for equitable contribution assessment and reward distribution, moving beyond the limitations of traditional DAO structures. Critically, this enhanced coordination is achieved without sacrificing verifiability or scalability; even as the number of agents within the system increases, the computational proof size remains remarkably constrained – consistently between 1,417 and 1,802 bytes – ensuring efficient on-chain validation and minimizing transaction costs. This sustained efficiency is pivotal for broader DAO adoption, promising a future where decentralized collaboration is not only possible, but also demonstrably more effective and accessible than centralized alternatives.

The pursuit of elegant solutions in decentralized systems invariably meets the harsh realities of production. This work, with its focus on constant-cost on-chain verification using zero-knowledge proofs and Shapley values, attempts to tame the complexity of multi-agent coordination. It’s a commendable effort, though one suspects that even this carefully constructed framework will, in time, accrue its own form of technical debt. As Ken Thompson observed, “Debugging is twice as hard as writing the code in the first place. Therefore, if you write the code as cleverly as possible, you are, by definition, not going to be able to debug it.” The DAO-Agent framework, while promising, will ultimately be judged not by its theoretical elegance, but by its resilience against the inevitable entropy of real-world usage and unforeseen edge cases.

What’s Next?

The pursuit of on-chain verification, as exemplified by DAO-Agent, continues a familiar pattern. Each layer of cryptographic assurance merely shifts the problem-and the associated computational burden-elsewhere. This work addresses scalability, but does not eliminate the fundamental tension between trustlessness and efficiency. The elegance of Shapley value allocation will inevitably encounter edge cases in production deployments-incentive gaming is not a bug, it’s a feature of any complex system. The cost of generating and verifying zero-knowledge proofs, while theoretically constant in this framework, will invariably prove sensitive to unforeseen parameters when scaled beyond controlled experimentation.

Future iterations will likely focus on practical optimizations-reducing proof sizes, exploring alternative commitment schemes, and attempting to amortize computational costs. However, the underlying premise – that blockchain is the ideal substrate for coordinating multi-agent systems – remains largely unproven. It’s worth considering whether off-chain computation, coupled with robust dispute resolution mechanisms, might ultimately prove more pragmatic. The real challenge isn’t building more complex architectures; it’s accepting that simpler solutions, however imperfect, often exhibit greater resilience.

One anticipates a proliferation of similar frameworks, each promising incremental improvements in verification costs or incentive compatibility. This is predictable. The field doesn’t require more innovation; it requires a more honest assessment of the trade-offs inherent in decentralized systems. Perhaps, instead of chasing ever-more-elaborate cryptographic solutions, the focus should shift to designing agents that are, simply, more robust to imperfect information and malicious actors. The problem isn’t a lack of tools-it’s a surfeit of illusions.


Original article: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.20973.pdf

Contact the author: https://www.linkedin.com/in/avetisyan/

See also:

2025-12-27 10:43